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BLACKMAIL, EXTORTION, AND EXCHANGE
WALTER BLOCK

I.

& GARY M.

ANDERSON*

INTRODUCTION

Blackmail sounds menacing and nefarious, an activity at its heart a
criminal enterprise. Indeed, in most modem countries and jurisdictions blackmail is in fact a crime, alongside murder, theft, and rape.
However, this grouping of the (admittedly) illegal act of blackmail with
crimes like murder is misleading on one score: blackmail is, per se, a
voluntary act between consenting adults.
A leading authority in the law and economics literature on the
problem of blackmail is Richard Posner.' He argues that the prohibition of this practice can be justified on grounds of economic efficiency.
Thus, he regards blackmail as an exception to the rule that free market
exchange maximizes wealth.
Posner defines blackmail as "the attempt to trade silence for
money." 2 But a more accurate definition would be willingness to trade
* Walter Block is the Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Chair in Economics,
College of Business Administration, Loyola University New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.
Gary Anderson is a Professor of Economics with the College of Business Administration
& Economics, California State University, Northridge, CA. The authors wish to thank
Hannah Block for editorial assistance. Walter Block wishes to thank David Kennedy,
Antony Sullivan and the Board of Trustees of the Earheart Foundation for their financial support. The usual disclaimers, of course, apply.
1. Richard Posner, Blackmail Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1817 (1993).
2. Id. Posner maintains that the following articles constitute "the best introduction to the scholarly literature": James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradoxof Blackmail, 84
CoLUM. L. REv., 670 (1984);James Lindgren, More BlackmailInk: a Critique of'Blackmai4
Inc., 'Epstein's Theory of Blackmail, 16 CONN. L. REv. 909 (1984);James Lindgren, In Defense of Keeping Blackmail A Crime: Responding to Block and Gordon," 20 Loy. L. REv. 35
(1986);James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L. REV.
597 (1989); James Lindgren, Kept in the Dark: Owen's view of Blackmail 21 CONN. L. REv.
749 (1989);James Lindgren, Secret Rights: A Comment on Campbell'sTheory of Blackmail, 21
CONN. L. REv. 407 (1989).

Id.

In addition to Posner's citations, we would include, on his own side of the debate
which defends the present illegality of blackmail, the following: Peter Alldridge, "Attempted Murder of the Soul": Blackmail Privacy and Secrets, 13 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 368
(1993); Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1639 (1993);
Gary Becker & Mitchell N. Berman, The Case Against Blackmail (Jan. 1985) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors); Mitchell N. Berman, TheEvidentiary Theory ofBlack-
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money for silence. What is the difference between the two versions? In

Posner's formulation, the blackmailer must initiate the deal. Accordmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 795 (1998);James Boyle, A Theory of Law
and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413
(1992); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as PrivateJustice, 141 U. PA L. REv. 1935
(1993); DebraJ. Campbell, Why Blackmail Should be Criminalized: A Reply to Walter Block
and David Gordon, 21 Loy. LA. L. RFv. 883 (1988); A.H. Campbell, The Anomalies of
Blackmail, 55 LEGAL QuAmERLY REv. 382 (1939); Coase, Ronald, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail 74 VA. L. REV. 655 (1988); George Daly &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities,
Extortion, and Efficiency: Reply, 68 AM. ECONOMIC REv. 736 (1978); Sidney W. DeLong,
Blackmailers,Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1663 (1993); Daniel
Ellsberg, The Theory and Practiceof Blackmail, in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 343 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975); Richard Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 553 (1983); Hugh Evans, Why Blackmail Should be Banned, PHILOSOPHY (1990);Joel
Feinberg, The Paradoxof Blackmail, 1 RATxioJuRis 83 (1988);JoEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING

(1988);JOEL

FEINBERG, HARMLESS

(NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1990); George P. Fletcher, Blackmail:
The Paradigmatic Case, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1617 (1993); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRAGr As
PROMISE 102 (1981); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic
Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv 1849 (1993); Arthur L. Goodhard, Blackmail and
Consideration in Contracts, 44 LEGAL QUARTERLY REv. 436 (1928), reprinted in, ARTHUR L.
GOODHARD, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 175 (1931); Wendy, J.
Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1741 (1993); Michael Gorr, Nozick's Argument Against Blackmail, 58 PERSONALIST 187,
(1977); Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 43
(1992); Vinit Haksar, CoerciveProposals,in PoLrTCAL THEORY 65 (1976); Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COL. L. REV. 603 (1943); Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coerdve State, 38 POL. Scj. Q. 470 (1923);
Russell Hardin, Blackmailingfor Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1787 (1993) ; MICHAEL
WRONGDOING

HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE, LONDON: ROUTLEDGE
AND KEGAN PAUL 29 (1975);Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmailfrom A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1905 (1993); R.S. Jandoo & W. Arthur Harland, Legally Aided Blackmail, 134 NEw L.

402 (1984); Leo Katz, Blackmail and OtherFormsof Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV 1567
(1993); Leo Katz &James Lindgren, Instead of a Preface, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1565 (1993);
William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4 J. OF LEGAL STUD.
43 (1975);James Lindgren, The Theory, History and Practiceof the Bribery-ExtortionDistinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695 (1993);James Lindgren, Blackmair An Afterward, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1975; Daniel Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 PHILOSOPHY 425; G.
MurphyJeffrie, Blackmai:A PreliminaryInquiry, 63 MONIST 156 (1980); ROBERT NozicK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (Basic Books, 1974); David Owens, Should Blackmail be
Banned?, 63 PHILOSOPHY 501 (1979); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW (4th ed. 1992); Richard Posner, Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1817 (1993); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and TheirLegality:
Blackmail, Extortion and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1877 (1993); L.G. Tooher, Developments in the Law of Blackmail in England and Australia, 27 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 337
(1978); Jeremy Waldron, Blackmail as Complicity (Nov. 1992) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the authors); Glanville Williams, Blackmail, in THE CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 79
(1954); W.H.D. Winder, The Development of Blackmail, 5 MOD. L. REv. 21 (1941).
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ing to the alternative definition, the first offer can come from either of
the two parties to the bargain. This difference is subtle but nonetheless highly significant. For example, suppose that A, an adulterer, approaches B, a party who knows of the adultery, and offers him money if
he, B, will not tell anyone about this secret. Posner, strictly speaking,
could not call this blackmail. Based on the proffered definition, how3
ever, we would have no problem labeling A's conduct as blackmail; it
is precisely the same trade of money for silence, no matter who initiates it.
Another critical definitional issue concerns the distinction between extortion and blackmail. Blackmail can only be an offer, not a
threat; extortion can be only the latter. Further, extortion is the threat
to do something which should be illegal (murder, rape, pillage), while
in blackmail the offer is to commit the paradigm lawful act (i.e., engage in free speech or gossip about secrets which embarrass or humili-

ate other people). For example, since it would be legal to reveal a
secret about adultery, it should also be lawful to offer to do just that, or
to accept money, when offered, in exchange for not making such a
revelation. 4 In contrast, since it is illegal to murder or rape, it should

also be a criminal act to threaten such acts.
3.
(1993).

See Leo Katz, Blackmail and OtherForms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1572

4. For the alternative point of view which favors blackmail legalization, see. Eric
Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 274 (1982); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE
ETHICS OF LIBERTY (New York University Press 1998); MuRRAY N.ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 443, n.49 (Mises Institute 1993); Walter Block, The Blackmaileras Hero, 4
LIBERTARIAN FORUM 3 (1972); WALTER BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE 44-49
(Fleet Press Corp. 1991); Walter Block & David Gordon, Extortion and the Exercise of Free
Speech Rights:A Reply to ProfessorsPosner,Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 Loy. L. A. L. REv.
37 (1985); Walter Block, Trading Money for Silence, 8 U. HAw'. L. REv. 57 (1986); Walter
Block, The Casefor De-CriminalizingBlackmaik A Reply to Lindgren and Campbell, 24 W. ST.
U. L. REv. 225 (1997); Walter Block, A LibertarianTheory of Blackmail, 33 IRISHJURIST 280
(1998); Walter Block & Robert W. McGee, Blackmailfrom A to Z, 50 MERCER L. R. 569
(1999); Walter Block, Toward a LibertarianTheory of Blackmail, 15J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD.
(forthcoming 2001); Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella & Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Secand Paradoxof Blackmail, 10 Q.J. OF Bus. ETHIcs 593 (2000); Walter Block, Let's Legalize
Blackmail, 30 SETON HAIL L. R v. 1182 (2000); Walter Block, Blackmailingfor Mutual
Good, 24 VT. L. R. 121 (1999); Walter Block, Blackmail and "Economic" Analysis, 21 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 165 (1999); Walter Block, Threats, Blackmail, Extortion, Robbery and
OtherBad Things, TULSA L. REv. (forthcoming); Walter Block, Blackmail is PrivateJustice,
33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. Rgv. (forthcoming 2000); Walter Block, The Crime ofBlackmail: A
LibertarianCritique, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1999); Walter Block, Replies to Levin and
Kipnis on Blackmail, 18 CRiM. JuST. ETHICS 23 (1999).
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Posner argues that "blackmail is, and should be, forbidden" because "it is likely to be, on average, wealth reducing rather than wealth
maximizing." 5 But if blackmail is voluntary, as Posner admits, 6 then it

must, ex ante, be wealth enhancing, since each party would only agree
to the contract if he receives something more valuable to him than
what he gives up. That is to say, the blackmailer values the money he
receives for his silence more than the disutility he receives from not
being able to broadcast the secret; the blackmailee values the preservation of his secret more than what it costs him. How, possibly, could
wealth not increase from such a contract, as it does from all voluntary
agreements? Our purpose here is to carefully critique Posner's model
of blackmail from this perspective.
This article is divided into five sections. Section II closely examines the differences between blackmail and extortion, and argues that
the former does, under all circumstances, represent an entirely voluntary transaction. Section III subjects Posner's elaborate taxonomy of
different types of blackmail to close scrutiny and shows that after adventitious coercive elements are clearly distinguished, what remains is
an ordinary market trade of a service for money. Section IV examines
various difficult cases in which non-coercive blackmail may become intermingled with, and subsequently confused with, theft and fraud. Finally, Section V summarizes and concludes the argument.
II.

BLAc imiL AND EXTORTION COMPARED AND CONTRASTED

Blackmail is often treated as a kind of intermediate case, partly
voluntary but partly coercive. Posner shares this view. Consider the
following statement by Posner:
.. contracts made under duress, a class of contracts with
which blackmail is often grouped. If an assailant points a
gun at you, saying, 'Your money or your life," you will
doubtless be very eager to accept the first branch of this
offer by tendering your money. There are third-party effects, but the essential objection to the transaction is that
the victim would prefer a regime in which such transactions were outlawed, because it would reduce the
probability of his receiving such unwanted offers (a quali5.

Posner, supra note 1, at 1817.

6.

Id. at 1818.
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fication is discussed later). In this case a restriction on7
freedom of contract protects a contracting party ex ante.
But this particular threat would represent an instance of extortion, not blackmail. Such an "offer" would not constitute a voluntary
contract. The phrase "or your life" clearly implies the robber's intent
to kill you, should you not submit to his threats. But from whence
does his right to perpetrate such a foul deed spring? Such a right does
not exist, since we have no right to murder other people. Contrast this
with a different offer: 'Your money or I go public with your secret adultery." If this offer is accepted, the result is a contract, not an instance of
robbery or extortion. The U.S. Constitution guarantees free speech
rights. If there is a right to speak, it logically follows that there is a
right to discuss speaking (e.g., to talk about the forthcoming speech,
warn of it, reveal one's willingness to refrain from so doing, perhaps
even for a fee).
This, however, is not the perspective adopted by Posner. Instead,
he states, "people desperately eager to pay blackmail would prefer not
to be blackmailed and would therefore prefer a regime in which blackmail is forbidden." 8 In his view, blackmail is akin to extortion. Butjust
because some people do not prefer a thing, does not mean that the
thing is criminal. People prefer not to get fat, lose customers, lose a
mate to a competitor, get beaten in sports, experience unrequited
love. This does not mean that an appropriate public policy would outlaw all of these things.
Posner clearly finds blackmail confusing. Indeed, he repeatedly
contradicts his earlier assertion that the practice is not voluntary. Although at one point he proclaims ".... it is a voluntary transaction
between consenting adults," only one paragraph later he returns to his
original theme: "[a]nother way of bringing out the commonality between duress and blackmail is to note that both involve threats." 9 But
this observation is highly misleading. Every voluntary interaction can
be couched in the form of a threat. "If you don't give me that newspaper," says the buyer, "I won't give you this fifty cents." The vendor
replies: "Oh, yeah? If you don't give me that fifty cents, I will not give
you this newspaper." What is this but a rather convoluted way of saying, "Hey, let's trade the paper for the four bits." When the vendor
threatens to withhold the newspaper unless the buyer hands him the
fifty cents, what else is he doing but attempting to transfer wealth from
the buyer to himself? To be sure, the vendor will give the buyer some7.
8.

Posner, supra note 1, at 1819.
Posner, supra note 1, at 1819.

9.

Id.
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thing in return for his money. However, at least from his own point of
view, the vendor will have registered a wealth improvement, since he
prefers the money to the daily paper.
All we have said about the newspaper sale "threat" also applies to
blackmail (as distinct from extortion). This is because what is
threatened in both scenarios is per se legal. In contrast, one may not
properly run off with your TV (nor, therefore, threaten to do so) since
it is your property. Such an extortionate action would, therefore, be
criminal.
Posner dismisses this distinction between coercive and non-coercive threats on the ground that all threats constitute a sterile redistribution activity, like simple theft. 10 Even conceding, for the sake of
argument, that the blackmail threat "diminishes social wealth by the
sum of the resources employed by the threatener to make his threat
credible and of the victim to resist the threat,"1 ' should that render it
fit for legal prohibition? There are lots of idle, time wasting, "sterile"
activities which, presumably, no one would wish to make into a criminal offense: watching soap operas, reading poetry, listening to nonbaroque music, gardening and camping.
Or consider voluntary charity, birthday gifts, and other forms of
altruism. Here, too, resources are used by the donor (e.g., to set up
criteria for gifts and to find the recipient) as well as the recipient (e.g.,
to adopt the behavior set for him in the criteria and to make an application). Surely, if threats are a drain on society, then charity also diminishes social wealth. But neither allegation is true. On the contrary,
both the donor and the recipient assume these costs voluntarily. Consequently, then, this behavior is not a drain on society, since neither
would do so if he did not expect to be more than compensated for his
initial investment. That is, the philanthropist expects more pleasure
from his donation than the attendant costs, and the recipient expects a
greater transfer of money than the costs of obtaining it, complying
with the applicable conditions, et cetera.
The same argument applies in blackmail cases, but not with extortion. In the latter, there is no voluntary exchange. The extortionist
might well gain, but the victim's rights are violated, in that he must
give up something to which he was legally entitled. When someone
extorts money from you with the statement "your money or your lifel"
and you give up the former, you are wronged since you own both. In
sharp contrast, when someone threatens "Give me money or I reveal
your secret," you are not wronged since you do not have title to both,
10.
11.

See Posner, supra note 1, at 1818.
Id. at 1820.
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any more than you may fairly claim title to both the money and the
newspaper in the previous example.
III.

PosNER's TAXONOMY

OF

BLAcr

msL DISSECTED

Posner carefully delineates seven different circumstantial categories across which the term blackmail applies. He proceeds to argue
that legal prohibition is efficient across these various categories. We
now turn to a detailed examination of this taxonomy.
A.

Criminal acts for which the blackmailer's victim has been
2
duly punished'

Which agency is more likely to maximize wealth or optimally allocate resources to the punishment of criminals-the market or the political system? If in your opinion it is the latter, then you will favor
disallowing the blackmail of, for example, ex-convicts as a form of private punishment. You will be content to substitute the wisdom of politicians in "a legislature mulling over the question whether to forbid
blackmail" 13 as to whether or not this should be allowed to occur.
Consider how Posner handles the case of the employer who refuses to hire a person with a criminal record, vis4-vis the blackmailer.
He states:
The difference is that the employer benefits from imposing this additional sanction; presumably it is a cost-minimizing policy. A blackmail transaction does not confer an
equivalent social benefit, once its deterrent effect is discounted because of concern with over deterrence. It
merely transfers wealth to the blackmailer. 14
But blackmail does not "merely" transfer wealth to the blackmailer; it also provides a service for the blackmailee, namely silence.
Thus the two cases are on a par, as holds true for all commercial activity; it benefits all traders. Posner attempts to deny this on the ground
that just because information garnered by blackmailers increases, it
will not necessarily be more widely disseminated: "the information
gathered by the blackmailer may be suppressed." 15 Yes, it will likely be
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Posner, supra note 1, at 1821.
Id. at 1822.
Id.
Id.
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disseminated if the blackmail contract is not consummated, and suppressed if it is. But wealth will increase either way.
In the former case, Posner concedes as much. 16 In the latter, he
complains, the stock of suppressed information will increase. But what
is wrong with attaining knowledge for its own sake, without spreading
it around? Every scholar who does research but does not publish is
guilty of that which Posner charges the blackmailer. Are we to jail all
of those who learn simply for their own pleasure without sharing it
with others? Nor can we even claim that quiet study and deliberation,
without "dissemination," is contrary to wealth creation. From the fact
that a man chooses to spend his time in this way, whether in the library, the laboratory, or as a blackmailer, we are entitled to deduce
that this was a productive use of his time, of greater value to him than
his opportunity costs, at least ex ante.
Posner claims it will be "rare"17 that information unearthed by the
blackmailer will be publicized: "often the benefits of the information
will be highly diffuse, being spread across a variety of actual and potential transactors with the blackmail victim, some of whom may not even
be identifiable."1 8 He gives as an example blackmailing a person with
AIDS who deceives his sex partners about his condition. But there are
all sorts of ways to internalize such externalities. One could publish
this information in a free society; potential customers include all those
contemplating sexual relations with anyone.
B.

Criminal acts that were not detected, hence not punished

The gist of Posner's critique is that government protection will
tend to "optimize law enforcement,"' 9 and that the activities of private
police, such as blackmailers, will move us away from this optimal point
and hence reduce wealth.
Posner relies on a model of crime and punishment which itself is
flawed. Here, "within some range, increasing the fine for an illegal
activity by another dollar is essentially costless and enables a reduction
in the resources devoted to catching and prosecuting offenders (and
hence the costs incurred in these activities) without any impairment of
deterrence." 20 But why should this essentially unjust, lawless approach
be accepted as the basis for optimization? It is unjust because, in principle, it allows for any punishment for any crime, and judges the results
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Posner, supra note 1, at 1822.
Posner, supra note 1, at 1820.
Id. at 1822-23.
Id. at 1823.
Id. at 1823-24.
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solely on the basis of "cost minimization." If the death penalty would
stop petty theft most efficiently, then, suggests this view, it should be
imposed; unasked is the question of whether someone who steals bubble gum deserves to be executed.
Another flaw is that this is essentially a central planning model of
law enforcement. The police are assumed to be governmental. When
Posner states "[p]rivate enforcers, however, may treat an increase in
the fine as an inducement to invest more resources in enforcement
21
rather than, as intended, as a signal to invest fewer resources," he
sees the "private enforcers" (i.e., the blackmailers) as interlopers, interfering with the privileged actions of the monopoly state police. Contrary to Posner, if a private policeman, who must withstand the market
22
test of profit and loss avoided by his public sector counterpart, decides to invest more resources in enforcement, then this is prima facie
proof that such expenditures are efficient, rather than inefficient.
Posner's critique of private enterprise police continues: "[p] rivate
enforcement can be disruptive in another way as well. Suppose police
obtain valuable information by paying informers. The price they pay
will be lower if blackmail is forbidden, since competition between police and blackmailers for information concerning guilt would drive up
23
the price of the information."
On this ground, all private enterprise should be forbidden, if it is
in any way in competition with the state. If the government owns a
steel mill, for instance, and private producers bid up the price of factors, such as labor, coal, and iron, against it, the government-horrors!-would have to pay more! Happily, Posner pulls back from this
precipice with the concession that "private enforcers might have so
much lower costs of operation than public enforcers as to make private
24
enforcement more efficient on balance than public enforcement."
Unfortunately, he does not place the burden of proof on the public sphere; for Posner, it is the private sector, which must prove its usefulness. 25 He states this in the context of his mirror image problem:
"we wanted to reduce rather than increase the severity of criminal punishments and, correspondingly, increase rather than reduce the invest21.
22.

Posner, supra note 1, at 1824.
See Patrick Tinsley, Private Police: A Note, 14J.

OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 95 (1998-

99); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY ch. 11 (Macmillan 1973).
23. Posner, supra note 1, at 1824.

24.

Id. at 1825.

25.

Strange, in a supposed friend of free enterprise.
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ment of resources in catching criminals." 2 6 The "we" here clearly
refers to government "But this is another reason not to rely on blackmailers, viewed as private law enforcers (which in a functional sense
they are), as part of our criminal law enforcement system. ' 27 If Posner
placed the burden the other way around (i.e., correctly), he would
have instead said that "this is another reason not to rely on [government
justice], viewed as [public] law enforcers, as part of our (private) law
enforcement system."
C. Acts that are wrongful but not criminal, such as acts that the common
law classifies as torts
Posner objects to blackmail in this case on the ground that "the
law has given the exclusive right of enforcement to the victim (which)
would be undermined by allowing a third party to blackmail the injurer - defendant. Blackmail would deplete the wrongdoer's resources
and thus make it more difficult for the victim of the wrong to enforce
his right to damages." 28 One problem with this answer is that it is an
instance of legal positivism. The law says X, therefore X is correct. Go
tell that to the victims of Nazism or Communism, many of whom were
unjustly but legally punished. The law may have given the exclusive
right to obtain money from the tortfeasor to the victim, but that arrangement may not be just.29 If no one has a right to obtain money

from a tort violator then anyone who sells him anything (e.g., a meal)
can be found guilty of a crime, and, presumably, punished to the same
extent as the blackmailer. This is because what the blackmailer is
guilty of in this instance, according to Posner, is not blackmail itself,
but rather "depleting the wrong doer's resources." The same result
occurs when the restaurant sells a meal to the criminal and charges
him a price.
It is true that the criminal has less money after the blackmailer or
restauranteur is through with him. But this simple observation is misleading. Both of these things - being blackmailed and buying food26. Posner, supra note 1, at 1824.
27. Id. at 1825.
28. Posner, supra note 1, at 1827.
29. On collapsing crimes into torts, see MuRRAY N. RoTmARD, THE ETHICS OF LimERTY (1998); MuRRAY N. RoTHBARD, FOR A NEw LIBERT-y (1973); Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of CriminalJustice, 87 ETHics 279 (1977); Randy E. Barnett,
GettingEven: Restitution, PreventiveDetention, and the Tort/CrimeDistinction, 76 Bos. U. L.
REv., 157-68 (1996).
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are consensual acts. As such, they increase wealth. This is obvious in
the case of the meal: if the criminal didn't purchase it, he would be
worse off. Perhaps he would even die. Then, surely, this purchase
would not "deplete the wrong doer's (total, real) resources." Presumably "the victim of the wrong" could obtain more compensation from a
live criminal than a dead one. However, the identical analysis applies
to blackmail. This act, too, increases the criminal's total resources,
even though his stock of money declines.
D. Acts, whether civilly or criminally wrongful, of which the blackmailer (or
his principal) was the victim
Posner claims "no one seems to object to a person's collecting information about his or her spouse's adulterous activities, and threatening to disclose that information in a divorce proceeding or other
forum, in order to extract maximum compensation for the offending
spouse's breach of the marital obligations." 30
Posner's inconsistency here is particularly glaring, since there is
no difference in principle between this and any other instance of
blackmail. In all such cases, this one specifically included, there is a
"threat" to do something completely licit, unless one is paid to refrain.
Why does the spouse who "threatens to disclose that information in a
divorce proceeding or other forum, in order to extract maximum compensation" not fit that bill? Blackmail is blackmail is blackmail. Why
should "a threat merely to litigate a civil suit" (emphasis added), or
"confidentiality clauses" which are paid for, not be considered
blackmail?
E.

Disreputable, immoral, or otherwise censurable acts that do not, however,
violate any law, or at least any commonly enforced law

Consider this statement from Landes and Posner: " [t] he social decision not to regulate a particular activity is a judgement that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover and punish it would be
socially wasted. Thatjudgement is undermined if blackmailers are encouraged to expend substantial resources on attempting to apprehend
and punish people engaged in the activity."''s This suggests a remarka30.
31.

Posner, supra note 1, at 1828.
Id. at 1829.
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ble confidence in our political institutions, one seemingly not shaken
32
even by the entire edifice of the Public Choice school.
Second, just because something is legal does not mean it is "encouraged." Eating lima beans is, at least so far, a protected activity.
But the state does not thereby encourage this practice, it only allows it.
We reject the notion that which is not prohibited is somehow
subsidized.

Posner explains his reasoning in the course of discussing the hypothetical example of a secret, non-practicing homosexual. He writes:
32.
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... assume that the blackmailer's victim is a homosexual and confided
this to a friend but refrains from homosexual acts, and in fact is marfled. The friend threatens to tell the victim's wife about his homosexuality unless the victim will pay him to keep silent. This is a classic
blackmail threat, yet it is difficult to see what the benefits would be of
33
allowing it to be made."
First, the notion that unless "benefits" can be shown, an act should
be prohibited, is a dubious proposition. Secondly, the act of blackmail
will encourage the blackmailee to pick his "friends" more carefully.
Third, there is the usual "benefit" in the case of blackmail: the homosexual values the silence of his "friend" more than the money he must
part with. The difference between these two is a net gain; it must be
positive, or he would not have agreed to pay.
Posner replies by listing three costs. "One would be to raise the
cost of having a homosexual preference - of being a homosexual. Another would be to increase the resources expended on discovering homosexual preference and on negotiating contracts to prevent the
discovery from being revealed. A third would be to increase the reand to other defensive
sources devoted to concealing homosexuality
'3 4
measures against the threat of blackmail.
But why is it unjust to raise the costs of being gay - higher, that is,
than they would have been had injustice been perpetrated on blackmailers? The point is, the only way to lower costs for homosexuals in
this way is to raise them for blackmailers. Why is the former group
more deserving than the latter?
In any case, gays are hardly the only non-typical group, which pays
extra costs. Adults above 6'5" and below 4'11" are forced to pay extra
costs for clothing; the same goes for those too fat or thin to wear offthe-rack products. The sick pay extra for medicine, as do those born
without limbs or kidneys. More is paid for food by those who have a
penchant for caviar instead of burgers. Diamonds cost more than costume jewelry. Is that fair? Would not wealth increase if these things
were cheaper? Should the government subsidize all of these things to
this end, the implication of Posner's analysis, in order to maximize
wealth?
Admittedly, legalizing blackmail might increase resources devoted
to defining sexual preference, but if all such investments are made vol33.
34.

Posner, supra note 1, at 1830.
Posner, supra note 1, at 1830-31.
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untarily, the presumption must be that the benefits will outweigh these
costs and that profit will be earned, at least ex ante.
Posner claims that "homosexuality is an involuntary and unalterable condition." 35 On this basis, he argues that legalizing blackmail
would bring "about a pure redistribution of wealth from the homosexual to the blackmailer." 36 But why should this occurrence, if true, be
rejected? Why should we believe that the allocation of wealth between
the blackmail and homosexual communities is ideal under prohibition
of the former? Why not of the latter? Since neither per se commits an
invasion of person or property, both should be allowed by law-and let
wealth distribution between them fall where it may.
And why is "entrapping"3 7 people so wrong that it should be prohibited by law? For the libertarian, the test is, "does an act per se involve the use of initiatory violence." Although pimping, prostitution,
alcohol, gambling, pornography,38 and entrapment sometimes do just
that, they need not do so, and therefore, should be legal. Posner, however, cites State v. Harrington, "[w] here the defendant, a lawyer, procured a woman to entice his client's husband to commit adultery with
her, and then threatened to expose the husband's adultery in order to
obtain better divorce terms for the wife."'3 9 No coercion was practiced
by either party in this example. However, "entrapment" of a sort occurs in everyday commercial and social life, though morally, but not
economically, distinguishable from this scenario. What are lipstick,
perfume and stockings but an attempt to "entrap" a man, perhaps
eventually into marriage? What are bargains, cut rate prices, specials
and other such arrows in the quiver of a retailer but attempts to "entrap" purchasers into buying things they otherwise might have gone
without? All advertising, whether or not of the beautiful-blond-sittingon-the-hood-of-a-car variety, is an attempt to "entrap" people into
40
opening their wallets.
35.

Id. at 1831.

36.
37.

Id.
Posner, supra note 1, at 1832.

See WALTER BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE (1976).
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For a critique of advertising which is consistent with Posner's views on entrapment, see JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrIH, THE AFFLUENT Sociniv (1958). For a definitive
rejoinder, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Non Sequitur of the "DependenceEffect," in STUDIES
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Posner declares that "blackmail really is the economic equivalent
of theft," and observes that "the blackmailer is unlikely to pay tax on
his blackmail income." 41 Certainly, when blackmail is illegal, the
blackmailer is no more likely to pay taxes than distillers were when
whisky was illegal. But now that booze is legal, firms in this industry
pay taxes. Why should it be any different for the blackmailer? But, for
the sake of argument, suppose it is. Assume, for example, that the
blackmailer, under legalization, still refuses to pay taxes. In other
words, he keeps his own money, protecting it from the predation of
the state, which attempts to steal it from him. The only way this could
amount to theft is if refusing to turn over a portion of your own hardearned money to the government 42 is considered stealing.
Consider Posner's treatment of gossip, which he describes as "an
informal and very cheap system of deterring the lesser forms of wrongdoing."43 He goes so far as to complain that gossip's "efficacy would be
undermined by blackmail because the gossip would sell his information to the blackmailer and thence to the wrongdoer and thereafter his
lips would be sealed." 44 This is particularly difficult to understand, in
view of the fact that Posner continually takes the side of the person
who is blackmailed. From this perspective, the target of blackmail
would vastly prefer to have his secret controlled by the blackmailer
rather than the gossip. In the latter case, the jig is up, and the information is revealed, no matter how great a value is placed upon it by the
blackmailee. In contrast, at least the blackmailer allows the
blackmailed to buy his way out of such a predicament, should he value
privacy more than its cost.
Ultimately, we must consider the starting point of the analysis.
Posner, whether purposefully or inadvertently, adopts that of the status
quo. The burden of proof, for him, rests on those who would change
the law from prohibition to legalization. In contrast, the initial pre41. Posner, supra note 1, at 1834.
42. This is a dubious claim since there is no contract or agreement between the
state and the individual indicating that the latter has agreed to pay anything to the
former. For the argument that taxation itself, and not refusal to pay tax, is theft, see
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETmIcs OF LIBERTY (1998); MuRRAY N.ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW
IJBERT-Y (1973); HANs-HERtaANN HOPPE, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTr. STUDIES IN PoLmCAL ECONOMY AND PHILOSOPHY (1993); HANs-HERMLANN HOPPE, A
THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND ETHICS (1989); LYSANDER SPOONER, No TREASON (1867).
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mise for the libertarian implies that blackmail is simply the "threat" to
engage in gossip. In a free enterprise, private property regime, to do
so does not constitute an invasion. Posner, curiously, defends gossip;
contradictorily, he finds the starting point of his analysis in a status
quo, which criminalizes "threats" or warnings of impending gossip.
Posner sees blackmail as a "form of extortion." Nothing could be
further from the truth. In the former case, the threat consists of doing
no more than one unarguably has a right to do: exercise his vocal
chords in an act of free speech. In the latter, and in sharp contrast,
one can threaten to "beat up"45 one's victim. Is the distinction between violating and not violating person and property a distinction not
worth making? This seems to be the implication of the Posnerian
world view.
F. Any of the acts in the previous categories, but the blackmailer's victim
did not in fact commit the actfor which he is being blackmailed16
According to Posner, "[a] blackmailer could attempt to blackmail
someone with a threat to accuse him falsely, but we should expect such
cases to be rare because the victim has a good remedy: sue the blackmailer for defamation. The remedy is not perfect, however, because
the blackmailer may not have the resources to pay a legal judgement.
Criminalizing this form of blackmail can thus be viewed as backing up
the law against defamation." 47
The clear implication is that the law prohibiting defamation is itself a legitimate one. Let us test this contention by asking if defamation is a per se violation of person or property rights. At first glance it
would appear to be an unequivocal interference with others, in that it
ruins their reputations. Upon further reflection, however, reputations,
even though they are self-referential, paradoxically consist of the possessions of others.48 That is, A's reputation consists of, and nothing
but, the thoughts of other people (e.g., B, C, D). What A does, tends
to determine his reputation, and he can capitalize on it by selling the
good will derived thereby. However, since A cannot own the thoughts
of B, C, and D, and his reputation consists of their thoughts and only
45.
46.
47.

Posner, supra note 1, at 1835.
See ia at 1836.
Id.

48.

See BLOCK, supra note 38, at 59.
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their thoughts, 49 he cannot, paradoxically (i.e., logically), own his reputation. Therefore, when we defame A, we are not doing anything akin
to stealing something from him. This being the case, it would be improper to criminalize our behavior. Thus, the case for prohibiting
blackmail on the ground that it "backs up the law against defamation"50 is not a very convincing one.
Suppose, somehow, that reputations are indeed legitimately
owned by the people to whom they refer. Then, defamation, as per
Posner, should indeed be a criminal act. But this position is open to
various reductios. Critical book, movie, and play reviews all, if successful, tend to denigrate the reputations of writers, producers, directors,
actors and playwrights. That is, all such critiques have negative effects
similar to defamation. If it is appropriate to legally proscribe defamation on this ground, this must apply to negative reviews of all other
kinds as well.
Let us grant that defamation is lying, while negative critiques express differences of opinion. To be sure, there are important differences between these two concepts. But in any given real world
situation, the two shade uncomfortably into one another. Is it a false
accusation, or a mere matter of opinion, for example, to say that Jay
Leno is a lousy comedian, or Robin Williams a poor actor? If lying is
the telling of an untruth, then anyone who asserts that 2+2=5, or that
the world is flat, should be clapped into prison. But what about "a
chicken in every pot?" Should lying politicians be imprisoned? How
about the claim that God exists? Is this a lie? Should all religious people bejailed? Do we really want to entrust such decisions to the tender
mercies of the state apparatus? The weather forecaster, surely, lies
roughly half the time. So do husbands who invariably tell their wives
their dress is attractive. Home owners often lie to criminals requesting
the whereabouts of their valuables. Under Posner, prison crowding
would dramatically and unwarrantedly escalate.
IV.

BLAcKMAm, Gossip,

SILENCE, AND THEFT

Consider Posner's explanation of ". . .why it is not blackmail for a
person who gets wind that another is about to disclose damaging information about him to approach that person and pay him to keep mum.
49. What A thinks of himselfhas much to do with his self-esteem, but nothing at all
with his reputation. For a critique of this concept, see MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN & DAVID
RA~isEy STEELE, THREE MINUTE THERAPY (1997).
50. Posner, supra note 1, at 1836.
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Allowing such transactions is unlikely to give rise to an industry of dirtseekers, with all the squandered resources thereby implied, since the
dirt-seekers could not advertise for or otherwise seek out customers
(which would be blackmail) but would have to wait for the latter to
51
come upon them by chance."
Of course, the mere approach to the blackmailer by the
blackmailee would not be considered criminal blackmail. The crime
of blackmail applies to the blackmailer, not the blackmailee who is
widely seen as the "victim" of the piece. The real question, then, is
whether the blackmailed person is guilty of a crime when he accepts the
blackmailer's offer of money for silence. Posner would answer in the
negative, due to the unlikeliness of squandered resources. A contrary
opinion is offered by Katz, who states that this is one of "a line of cases
that has regularly plagued German criminal courts."5 2 That is to say, at
least in the minds of German judges, it is by no means as clear as Posner seems to think.
But suppose, if only for argument's sake, that Posner is correct in
his view that this is not blackmail. Could his unlikeliness of squandered resources be the correct explanation? There are reasons to reject this hypothesis. What is to prevent a wealth "wasting" Blackmail
Inc.5 3 from trolling in an attempt to encourage potential blackmaileds
to approach him? An example: Blackmail, Inc. knows that A has been
unfaithful to his wife. Blackmail, Inc. cannot, of course, approach A
directly, and offer to maintain silence, in return for money. That
would be illegal for Posner. However, the Blackmail corporation can
approach A, or write him a letter, informing him of an intention to
"tell all" to Mrs. A. Then, he can sit back and wait for A to approach
him, the blackmailer. Strangely, Posner himself mentions this scenario 5 4 without realizing how it undercuts his own case. It may not constitute blackmail in Posner's view, but it has all the earmarks of
blackmail. As well, it is as "resource-wasting" as the ordinary, traditional, more direct blackmail.
Posner asks why blackmail is "regarded with great distaste and
punished severely in comparison with other nonviolent thefts?" 55
However, as we have argued above, blackmail is not theft. In theft,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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Katz, supra note 3, at 1571.
See Richard Epstein, Blackmai4 Inc., 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 553 (1983).
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someone steals your money under the threat of inflicting violence on
you or yours. Clearly, he has no right to initiate such violence. In
blackmail, someone threatens to gossip about you unless paid off.
Posner offers several explanations for the relative severity of legal
sanctions in the case of blackmail. First, he argues that blackmail involves advance planning as opposed to being impulsive. 5 6 This argument provides only weak support of blackmail prohibitionism since the
fact that something is premeditated-canned speeches, marriage pro57
posals-does not necessarily render it fit for criminalization.
Another argument offered by Posner is that it would be difficult to
capture blackmailers; after all, the blackmailee will scarcely complain,
fearing the loss of his secret. According to Posner, "[b]ecause the
probability of punishment is very low, the punishment must be set high
to deter, and so blackmail will have the appearance of being a serious
crime."5 8
There is yet another eminently reasonable explanation offered by
Posner. "Rational blackmailers will not approach people who are likely
either to defy them or to bargain them down, but will concentrate on
the psychologically or otherwise vulnerable. This selection bias will
make the blackmailer seem especially vicious and predatory, and will
thus create pressure for severe punishment."5 9 Who are the "vulnerable?" Surely, among other things, they have the lowest productivity.
That is, there is a positive correlation between "vulnerability" in this
sense and "squandering" resources. So, if we want to increase the per
capita gross domestic product, and no advocate of the "economic approach" 60 worthy of his econometric equations could reject that, any
phenomenon which particularly disconcerts, brings down, and in the
extreme, drives to suicide those with low earnings capacity, is only to
be applauded. Blackmail, according to Posner, fits that bill to a "T,"
61
preying on those who are "psychologically or otherwise vulnerable."
Therefore, blackmail will maximize wealth by eliminating, or at least
reducing the control over resources, of those with less ability in this
regard. Per capita GDP will tend to rise.
56. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1836-37.
57. A synonym for "premeditated" is "purposeful."
58. Posner, supra note 1, at 1837.
59. Id. at 1839.
60. To call this the "economic" approach is to imply, falsely, that all economists
must adhere to it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Less tendentious nomenclature might be "the Chicago School" approach.
61. Posner, supra note 1, at 1839.
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Posner claims as an "effect of the criminalization of blackmail,
62
that of eliminating property rights in the blackmailer's information."
But this is not so. When blackmail is criminalized, the blackmailer still
owns the information. The real effect is that of placing a price ceiling
of zero on it. He still owns it and can still dispose of it, but only for
free, that is, as a gossip. Criminalization merely means that he cannot
sell it. This must be something of an anomaly for a member of the
Chicago school in good standing, who can usually be counted upon to
oppose price controls. Every empirical generalization, it would appear,
can have exceptions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Blackmail has sinister connotations in everyday discourse, suggesting shady dealing and ill-gotten gain. But blackmail per se, the exchange of silence for cash, is an uncomplicated voluntary act between
consenting adults. It would seem to constitute a simple example of
mutually beneficial exchange.
Richard Posner is on record as holding to an ethic of wealth maximization, which justifies institutions based on consent. Logically,
then, Posner should favor the legalization of blackmail insofar as it is a
voluntary trade of money for silence, and consequently net-wealth enhancing. But he does not; instead, he supports the legal status quo of
prohibition.
We have argued that voluntary blackmail becomes easily confused
with coercive extortion, and that this fact accounts for some of Posner's objection to legalization. But legal positivism also plays a role; to
Posner, laws against blackmail are assumed to be efficient, and hence
justified, because they exist. Thus the anomaly of a leading Chicago
school economist favoring the continued prohibition of this particular
"capitalist act between consenting adults" 63 becomes understandable,

if not justifiable.
When blackmail is criminalized, the real effect is that of placing a
price ceiling of zero on it; the prospective blackmailer still owns the
damaging information and can still dispose of it, but only for free, that
is, in the form of gossip. Criminalization, in other words, merely means
that he cannot sell it.
62.
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Consider some other examples of activities subject to social opprobrium which also happen to be currently illegal: buying and selling
heroin; prostitution; baby selling; pornography; and commerce in used
body parts (e.g., kidneys) .64 All of these things have one thing in common with blackmail: not a one of them violates the libertarian axiom
of non-aggression against non-aggressors. Blackmail is blamed for the
same reasons as all these others; there is an insufficient appreciation
for the virtue and value of laissez faire capitalism and individual sovereignty. Blackmail prohibition is merely one more instance of the violation of these principles.

64.
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